

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SINAI 1335

FOR SSM KONTOS ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, EG, IS
SUBJECT: UN INSPECTION OF THE LFZ

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE EVALUATION YOU REQUESTED OF UN OPERATIONS IN THE SINAI LIMITED FORCE ZONE. A COPY IS BEING SENT TO CAIRO FOR NGWTHORNE'S COMMENT.

2. SUMMARY. UN INSPECTION OF THE LIMITED FORCE ZONE CONTINUES TO BE A CRUCIAL BUT DISPUTED PART OF SINAI II PEACEKEEPING. THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND WEAKNESSES IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS WHICH DISTURB THE TWO PARTIES AND DECREASE CONFIDENCE. WHILE RECOGNIZING INHERENT LIMITATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM, UNEF COULD NONETHELESS IMPROVE ITS HANDLING OF VIOLATIONS, RESIST RESTRICTIONS ON ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND ASSERT ITS MONITORING ROLE MORE FIRMLY. AS PARTNERS IN THIS SINAI ENDEAVOR, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ASSIST THE UN AS POSSIBLE.

3. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS. INSPECTION OF THE LIMITED FORCE ZONE (LFZ) IS A KEY BUT UNSATISFACTORILY HANDLED ELEMENT IN THE UN'S SINAI MONITORING. BOTH PARTIES ARE CONCERNED. BEFORE CRITIQUING THIS UN FACTION, HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT OTHER UNEF DUTIES ARE BEING PERFORMED RELATIVELY UNCHALLENGED: CONTROL OF BUFFER ZONE ACCESS, RUNNING PATROLS, AND MANNING CHECKPOINTS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE EGYPTIAN

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LFZ IS HARDER TO INSPECT BECAUSE IT IS LARGER THAN THE ISRAELI ONE AND BECAUSE EGYPT SPREADS OUT ITS FORCES RUSSIAN STYLE WHILE ISRAEL CLUSTERS THEM FOR MOBILITY. AND FINALLY, THE LFZ ARRANGEMENT DISADVANTAGES EGYPT. THE NARROWNESS OF THE ISRAELI LFZ PERMITS PLACING MILITARY FORCES CLOSE TO THE BUFFER ZONE WITHOUT DILUTION BY THE LFZ FORCE RESTRICTIONS. EGYPT MUST CONTEND WITH GREATER DISTANCES AND THE CANAL.

4. LFZ INSPECTION DEFICIENCIES. THE MAJOR UN WEAKNESSES ARE ORGANIZATIONAL, ACCEPTANCE OF RESTRICTIONS BY THE PARTIES, AND INSUFFICIENT ASSERTIVENESS OF THE INSPECTION ROLE. THE CHIEF ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS ARE DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLEXITY. THE CHIEF LIMITATIONS ARE PERMITTING THE PARTIES TO REFUSE INSPECTION OF SOME AREAS, TO THWART DIRECT INTERROGATION OF LOCAL COMMANDERS, AND TO LIMIT ON SITE ACCESS. UNEF ITSELF MAY BE TOO HESITANT ON INSPECTION SCHEDULING AND RESOLVING VIOLATIONS.

5. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS. INSPECTION ORGANIZATION IS CUMBERSOME AND RESPONSIBILITY IS DIVIDED. UNEF SCHEDULES LFZ INSPECTIONS, SETS GUIDELINES, REPORTS VIOLATIONS AND ABSORBS COMPLAINTS. UNTSO CONDUCTS THE INSPECTIONS AND CONTENDS WITH THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE RESPONSIBILE UNTSO SUBUNIT IS THE OBSERVER GROUP SINAI (OGS), OF ABOUT 124 UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS (UNMOS). THEY HAVE CHECKPOINT AND LIAISON ASSIGNMENTS AS WELL AS INSPECTION DUTIES. THE OGS IS DIVIDED INTO TWO SEPARATE GROUPS. ONE BODY OF 70 WORKS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE BUFFER ZONE AND ITS COMMANDER IS IN JERUSALEM. THE OTHER COVERS THE EGYPTIAN SIDE; ITS COMMANDER IS IN CAIRO. THERE IS ONE COORDINATING OFFICER, LT. COLONEL DOYLE (IRISH) AT UNEF HEADQUARTERS IN ISMAILIA. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE AD HOC INSPECTIONS WHEN UNMOS ARE SCATTERED AND ARE SCHEDULED MONTHLY ON VARIED DUTIES. WHILE OGS COMMANDERS ASSIGN SOME EXPERIENCED OFFICERS FOR EACH INSPECTION, THERE ARE NO SPECIALIZED OR STANDBY UNMO INSPECTORS. EXISTING EXPERIENCE IS PARTLY
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LOST AS AN UNMO WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE ASSIGNED THE SAME LFZ ZONE. INSPECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED ONLY BI-WEEKLY; AD HOC AND FOLLOW UP ONES ARE NEEDED. RESULTS ARE NOT TRANSMITTED QUICKLY. THE OGS SUBGROUPS REPORT THEIR FINDINGS TO UNEF, NOT DIRECTLY TO THE PARTIES. A PRELIMINARY REPORT TAKES 24 HOURS OR LONGER TO REACH THE PARTIES; THE FINAL ONE ABOUT THREE DAYS. THIS IS SLOW.

6. CONFLICTING INTERESTS. UNEF LEADERS, WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL INSPECTION PROCESS, ARE SENSITIVE TO THE PARTIES' REACTIONS AND TO ONGOING RELATIONS. UNEF'S MANDATE, AFTERALL, IS RENEWED YEARLY. THE UNTSO INSPECTION GROUPS TEND TO BE MORE CONCERNED WITH INSPECTION INTEGRITY AND THE PARTIES' RESTRICTIONS. UNTSO WAS CREATED BY A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN 1948 AND NEEDS BE LESS POLITICALLY RESPONSIVE.

7. AREA INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS. BOTH ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN COMMANDERS HAVE STOPPED UNMOS FROM VISITING SOME LFZ AREAS. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE (IDF) REGULARLY PREVENTS UNMOS FROM APPROACHING A STATION (APPARENTLY ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE) IN THE SOUTHERN LFZ (DMATC, 1/100,000, 7983/7856). EGYPTIAN COMMANDERS HAVE PUT VARIOUS AREAS OFF-LIMITS AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND HAVE MADE INSPECTION DIFFICULT IN ZONES EAST OF THE BITTER LAKE.

8. RESTRICTION ON CONTACTS. THE IDF PUTS NO RESTRICTIONS ON UNMOS QUESTIONING LOCAL COMMANDERS OR MEN. EGYPT HAS INSISTED THAT UNMOS MAY NOT TALK TO OFFICERS OR MEN AND MAY PUT QUESTIONS ONLY THROUGH THE ACCOMPANYING LIAISON OFFICER. THIS SEVERELY LIMITS THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION ON UNITS, NUMBERS AND ACTIVITIES.

9. ON SITE RESTRICTIONS. ACCORDING TO UNMOS, EGYPTIAN LIAISON OFFICERS AND LOCAL COMMANDERS WILL PREVENT CLOSE INSPECTION AT SITES. THE IDF DOES NOT. IT HAS BECOME AN ESTABLISHED RULE THAT UNMOS MAY NOT ENTER AN EGYPTIAN TENT, ENCLOSURE, OR BUNKER. IT HAS ALSO BECOME COMMON PRACTICE, UNMO'S REPORT, FOR EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS TO HEAD FOR THESE SHELTERS

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ON APPROACH OF UN VEHICLES. IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO HAVE CRATES OR BOXES AT EGYPTIAN SITES OPENED FOR INSPECTION. SENIOR UNTSO AND UNEF OFFICERS HAVE USED THEIR RANK TO DISREGARD SUCH LIMITATIONS. UNMOS, HOWEVER, ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO CONTEST REFUSALS.

10. LIAISON OFFICERS. THE SINAI AGREEMENT SAYS THAT UNEF WILL INSPECT THE LFZ. THE IMPLEMENTING PROTOCOL STATES THAT INSPECTION TEAMS WILL BE ACCCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS (LO). THE LATTER PROVISION CAN BE USED TO FRUSTRATE THE FORMER. UNMOS STATE THAT EGYPTIAN LOS HAVE REFUSED TO ENTER SOME AREAS. ALSO, EGYPTIAN LOS WERE LATE ASSEMBLING FOR THE SPECIAL INSPECTION REQUESTED LAST JUNE BY ISRAEL. THE INSPECTION WAS DELAYED EIGHT HOURS. UNEF HAS RULED INTERNALLY THAT THERE WILL BE NO INSPECTION WITHOUT LOS NOR MAY INDIVIDUAL UNMO INSPECTION TEAMS MOVE WITHOUT THE LOS. MOVEMENT WITHOUT LOS IS A SENSITIVE MATTER AND POSSIBLY DANGEROUS; BUT LETTING THE ARRIVAL OR DECISIONS OF LOS DETERMINE THE COURSE OF INSPECTIONS CAN BE SERIOUSLY RESTRICTIVE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SINAI 1335

FOR SSM KONTOS ONLY

11. CRITERIA FOR INSPECTING. UNEF'S INSPECTION ROLE IN THE LFZ HAS MANY OPERATIONAL SIMILARITIES TO SFM'S MONITORING OF THE EARLY WARNING ZONE AND VERIFICATION OF THE SURVEILLANCE STATIONS. WE FACE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. BOTH UNEF AND SFM ARE CAST IN ROLES ANALOGOUS TO A REFEREE. THE CRITERIA FOR A GOOD REFEREE IS TO MAKE ACCURATE, QUICK, FIRM CALLS; TO COUNTER INTIMIDATION OR OBSTRUCTION BY PLAYERS; AND TO PROMOTE GENERAL RESPECT FOR THE RULES. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO BOTH SFM AND UNEF CONDUCT OF THEIR FUNCTIONS.

12. INSPECTION HESITANCY.

A. BY THE PRECEDING CRITERIA, UNEF'S INSPECTION PERFORMANCE COULD BE BETTER. INSPECTION RESULTS DO NOT REACH THE PARTIES QUICKLY. TO SOME EXTENT, THEY ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO OUTSIDE CONSIDERATIONS. AFTER UNEF REPORTED 8,034 EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE LFZ IN LATE JUNE (8,000 BEING THE PERMITTED NUMBER) SFM WAS INFORMED THAT UNEF WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT ONLY SIGNIFICANT DEGREES OF VIOLATION. THIS MAY EASE PRESSURES, BUT IT FUZZES THE (REFEREE) CALL AND RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE SYSTEM.

B. THE RESTRICTIONS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED ON THE INSPECTION PROCESS ALSO WEAKEN THE SYSTEM AND THE PARTIES' CONFIDENCE IN IT. THE UN IS NOT GENERALLY HELD IN HIGH REGARD BY BOTH EGYPTIAN AND CONFIDENTIAL

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ISRAELI LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS. EACH PARTY MAY FIND OPERATIONAL OR SHORT TERM ADVANTAGES TO DILUTING THE INSPECTION PROCESS, BUT IN THE LONG RUN THEY ARE LIKELY TO DISRESPECT THE UN MORE FOR BEING ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH IT.

C. THE CONTINUANCE OF INSPECTION ISSUES (DEFINITION OF BATTALION, LIMITATIONS ON UNEF) MAY BE LARGELY THE PARTIES' RESPONSIBILITY. BUT IT AFFECTS THE PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM AND THE UN. AS A REFEREE, UNEF NEEDS INSIST THAT THE PARTIES RESOLVE THESE MATTERS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT UNEF, AND PERHAPS HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, HAVE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT TO GOOD RELATIONS THAN TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM.

D. THE SINAI ZONE IS CURRENTLY RELATIVELY QUIET. ISSUES AFFECTING THE PEACEKEEPING PROCESS SHOULD BE SETTLED NOW. IF UNEF CANNOT

DEVELOP MORE OPERATIONAL INSPECTION AUTHORITY AND EXERCISE IT
MORE FIRMLY, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT INDEED TO FUNCTION UNDER
TENSER CONDITIONS. A WEAK REFEREE CANNOT MAKE A RESPECTED CLUTCH
CALL.

13. US INTEREST - THE SINAI AGREEMENT JOINTLY INVOLVES THE US
(SFM) AND UNEF IN PEACEKEEPING. SFM HAS EARNED SOME RESPECT FOR
ITS ROLE. BUT A SYSTEM CAN ONLY BE AS GOOD AS ITS RELATED PARTS.
IT IS IN US INTERESTS TO ENCOURAGE THE UN ROLE AND TO ASSIST IN
IMPROVEMENT OF UNEF OPERATIONS. IT WOULD APPEAR DESIRABLE TO
SUPPORT UNHQ JERUSALEM'S INITIATIVE TO INCREASE UNDOF MONITORING
CAPABILITY (SINAI 1320) BOTH IN TERMS OF TECHNICAL ADVICE AND,
IF NEEDED, WITH EQUIPMENT. IT WOULD ALSO SEEM HELPFUL TO ENCOUR-
AGE MORE ACTIVELY RESOLUTION OF THE BATTALION ISSUE AND TO RE-
VIEW AT AN APPROPRIATE UN OR UNEF LEVEL THE LIMITATIONS ON LFZ
INSPECTIONS. ROBERTS

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